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The Insanity Defense
Guilty by Reason of Hinckley?

Bruce Berner
Anyone who believes that the criminal process is
merely a conveyor-belt scheme for dealing with the
seamy side, and not a lens for continuous, fierce moral
struggle, may well rethink the matter in light of John
Hinckley, Jr.'s acquittal and the ensuing reaction. One
cannot ordinarily measure the strength of society's collective retributive impulse when a highly visible defendant is convicted; indeed, it is the function of the
criminal conviction to channel that impulse in a moreor-less civilized way. "Hinckley's been convicted," we
might have said. "Good. Let us get on to Bobby's ballgame." The acquittal, however, uncovered the depth of
fear, rage, and moral indignation, now without institutionalized expression, within all of us. Like electricity deprived of its destination, these emotions broke
out in all directions seeking new outlets for their energy.
Nor can this reaction be wholly accounted for by the
fact that President Reagan was the intended victim.
Clearly, Hinckley is viewed in part as a surrogate for
all perpetrators of violence, Reagan, Brady and the
others as surrogates for the potential victim in all of
us, and the acquittal as symptomatic of a system that
cannot deal with crime. If the President is not exempt
from such violence, can anyone feel safe?
Frustrated by the outcome, many people seemed to
say, "If John Hinckley isn't guilty, then someone or
something else is." Nothing escaped completely unsullied- the jury, psychiatry, the criminal process in
general, and, above all, the insanity defense.
The most immediate attack was on the individual
jurors. As I listened to the call-in shows the evening of
and day after the verdict, with caller after caller registering outrage and shock at the outcome, it occurred
to me that many of the callers' comments presupposed
that the jurors in the Hinckley trial had been shipped
in from Venus. They did not know that "defendants
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just claim to be insane to get off the hook" or that "psychiatrists and lawyers are really streetwalkers in expensive suits" or that "everybody is a little insane,
really." (Some of the callers provided persuasive evidence for this last point.) But a case against the jurors
could not long be maintained. It became clear (largely
because this jury was uncharacteristically vocal) that
the jurors were not ingenues, that they had not brought
less to their decision than the callers, but more. Street
wisdom was not lacking, but it had been tempered by
the solemnity attendant upon making a morally serious
judgment. Juror Nathalia Brown stated during deliberations, "The issue is not whether he was a little off, or
whether this poem or that one didn't make sense. He
shot those people, he shot them on purpose, he planned
the whole thing out. He should be punished. What
gives here! The man is just a manipulator. Ain't nothing
wrong with him." This lady ain't from Venus, either,
but she ultimately voted to acquit.

The Mora/Issue of Responsibility
The frustration focused on the insanity defense,
aided by the statement of juror Maryland Copelin,
who closed the jury's defense by saying: "We felt locked
in by the law." The law that locked in Ms. Copelin and
the others is the insanity defense. Overnight, movements in scores of forums arose to abolish or weaken
the defense. My purpose herein is to examine the fundamental underpinnings of the insanity defense, to evaluate the various proposals being made for its modification, and to suggest one change myself. My thesis
is that all current proposals either misunderstand, or
are willing for expediency's sake to jettison, the core
idea of a criminal law by ignoring or hiding the moral
issue of responsibility. The proposal made herein is to
implement an old, but untried, approach which presents the moral question with a clarity that cannot be
sidestepped.
The most radical proposal, already adopted in two
states (Idaho and Montana) is abolition of the insanity
defense. This solution is a straightforward instrumental
attack on the perceived problem of violent offenders.
Although this solution draws great political impetus
from the Hinckley case, it is a dangerous solution,
negates the basic purpose of the criminal law, and rests
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The criminal process 's value as a technique for deciding highly charged moral issues is
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on a tacit premise which is simply not true. If a man
had leprosy, surely we would isolate him to prevent
contamination of others. While this may not be fair to
him in a very strict sense, his confinement as an instrument for the public good is clearly defensible. But,
unless we held fast to earlier cultural notions that his
disease was a manifestation of some grave personal sin,
we would not see as necessary a ritual of moral condemnation. A criminal conviction is, of course, just
such a ritual. The eminent scholar Henry Hart helped
expose the 1950s myth that the peno-correction process
was the rehabilative technique of a compassionate society by stating "What distinguishes a criminal from a
civil sanction and all that distinguishes it ... is the
judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition." Of course it is more
difficult to diagnose insanity than leprosy, and mistakes will be made, but it is as necessary today as ever
before, from a moral standpoint, to distinguish between
people who are sick and people who are bad.
None of this proves that the dangerously insane need
not be confined, like the leper. Of course he must, but
it perverts the criminal process (and thus weakens it
for all purposes) to make it do the job. Involuntary
commitment procedures are available in all jurisdictions; in most, a criminal acquittal on grounds of insanity automatically triggers such a process.
The criminal process's value as a technique for deciding highly charged moral issues is weakened, if not
destroyed, when used as the all-purpose agency of
social control. Note that 50 per cent of the police and
prosecutorial resources in this country are expended
to fight gambling, prostitution, and low-level drug
traffic. The main "benefit" from this is the alienation
of large groups of people who do not adopt the law's
morality as their own. In fact, the abolition of the insanity defense is even worse. Although people may
honestly disagree about the morality of gambling, I
am aware of no current serious argument that people
who act as a result of mental illness are morally culpable. Moreover, if the criminal process were to be used
as a wide-ranging body for social control, it could not
work with its current rules. The accused is given a professional representative whether he can afford one or
not, proof is required "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
and the decision is made by a jury of twelve. We cannot
solve too many social problems with so cumbersome an
apparatus as this. As a matter of fact, the rules and
trappings of a criminal trial would appear absolutely
ridiculous to us were we not persuaded that conviction
carried a powerful moral pronouncement about the accused and that such pronouncements are only tragically
made to innocent persons.
Another proposal-to remove insanity questions from
8

the guilt phase of the trial and use it during sentencing
to mitigate punishment-is subject to the same objections. Criminal responsibility is a moral question anterior to any punishment. It ought to be decided by the
jury, the community's representative, and not by a
judge. Of course, a judge may choose to reduce the
sentence for a defendant who, while suffering some
mental illness, is not so ill as to avoid completely any
moral condemnation. The proposal, however, makes the
criminal process incoherent-the guilt phase, designed
to deal with moral questions, now avoids the most
fundamental one of all. The criminal process absolutely
depends on an image of man free to make choices.
Many recognized defenses, such as self-defense, duress,
or accident, indicate that we are not interested in punishing conduct which was not the function of choice,
or in which choice was restricted among intolerable
alternatives. The notion of a separate system for juveniles rests on the understanding that anti-social actions
by certain people indicate therapeutic, not retributive,
response. To suggest the culpability of those who act
wholly from illness, illness which by its nature excludes
all socially-tolerable choices, is to suggest that individual
fault is foreign to the inquiry. Perhaps even worse, it
might suggest that people are ultimately to be blamed
for their illnesses.

Burying the Essential Moral Question
The proposal of a new verdict form- "guilty but
mentally ill" (GBMI) - already law in six states, including Indiana, will , I think, become law in most
jurisdictions. When GBMI is in force, a jury in a criminal trial in which insanity is interposed, is given four
choices of verdict: 1) "not guilty"; 2) "not guilty by
reason of insanity"; 3) "guilty" ; and 4) "GBMI." The
defendant found "GBMI" is, for all purposes, deemed
guilty of the offense. H e is, however, "evaluated" to
determine whether he should begin his term in jail or
in a mental institution. If he is sent to the latter, and is
at any time prior to the expiration of his term released
therefrom, he is returned to the prison population to
finish his term. The idea is beguiling-the mentally
ill defendant is given treatment for his problem but
cannot be released into society any more quickly than if
he had been found "guilty." It seems a nice finesse of a
very difficult problem.
Closer examination shows that this proposed solution is either entirely meaningless as a response to the
perceived problem or, like earlier proposals, buries
the moral question. When the jury is asked to decide
from among these four outcomes, it is given the legal
tests both for "insanity" and for "mental illness." The
test for insanity most prevalent today (it is the law of
The Cresset
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Indiana and also of the Hinckley case) is: "A person is
not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform his conduct to the r equirements of the law." ("Substantial-capacity" test).
The jury refers to this to decide whether or not the defendant is "not guilty by reason of insanity." In determining whether the defendant is "GBMI," the jury
is instructed: "mentally ill means having a psychiatric
disorder which substantially disturbs a person's
thinking, feeling, or behavior and impairs a person's
ability to function and includes mental retardation."
The jury must visualize the class of persons who are
"mentally ill" as larger and wholly inclusive of the
class of "insane" persons. Definition of the mentally ill
class does not, however, expressly exclude those who are
"insane." If the defen dant is "mentally ill" but not
"insane," the jury's task is clear. If the jury believes
the defendant is "insane," however, it is not told the
basis for deciding between "not guilty by reason of insanity" and "GBMI." If the jury were told that the
proper outcome in such cases was "not guilty by reason
of insanity," then GBMI is hardly going to cure Hinckley-like results. On the other hand, if "insane" persons
can be found "GBMI," the insanity defense is de facto
abolished. The jury is appeased into believing the defendant will not really be punished, but treated. As a
matter of fact, there is no guarantee that a defendant
found GBMI will receive any treatment in a mental
institution.
One final proposal would shift the burden of proof
on the sanity question to the defendant. Indiana, for
example, requires the state to prove everything else
"beyond a reasonable doubt," but requires the defendant to prove insanity by a "preponderance of the
evidence." With all respect, the only purpose for this
change, which runs contrary to the notion that criminal
punishment ought depend on community judgment
"to a moral certainty" and not merely when we are
"confused" about moral questions, and which begins
to erode the accusatorial style of Anglo-American
criminal trials by forcing defendants to "disprove"
guilt, is to change outcomes. It is based only on the
speculation that "too man y" defendants are acqu itted.
T he often-heard complaint that a defendant need
only p lead insanity and the jury will become so confused as to acqu it simply is not empirically su pportable. If one asks experienced criminal defense counselthe people, after all, most clearly "in the marketplace"
for defenses-he will be told that insanity is the defense
of last resort. It is such both because juries are traditionally reluctant to accept it, and because, in many
cases, the p enalty for insanity is less desirable to the
September, 1982

defendant than the penalty for the crime. One way to
test this is to search your memory for any case in which
the defense was raised to a charge other than murder
or its attempt, the crimes carrying the highest penalty.
In fact, the Hinckley case is one of only a very few in
which the defense was interposed to attempted murder.

Moral, Psychiatric, and Legal Aspects
My proposal is not to discard nor obscure the moral
question of responsibility but to make it more clear to
the jury that such is precisely what they are supposed
to decide. In an insanity-defense case, three components
must be managed. First there is a moral component, the
decision of who is and who is not deserving of punishment. While this ju dgment may be shared to some extent, it is the ju ry which answers the question at its
core. Second, a clinical, or medical, or psychiatric componen t represented by expert witnesses is needed to
inform the moral judgment. The legal component has
two main tasks, each of which it carries out through the
expression of a "test" for insanity and through rules
on expert testimony. One task is to provide a standard
for decision to insure equality across cases, though
surely this "test" is itself informed by the moral judgment. The second, and perhaps more important, task
is to mediate between the moral and the psychiatric
components so that each operates properly within its
sphere but does not impinge on th e other. My contention is that the law does not do this very well- that,
instead, the psychiatric component tends to overpower
the moral one in many cases.
Note first that "insanity" is not a medical, psychiatric, or clinical term. It is strictly the stating of a legal
outcome. The on ly un mistakable symp tom of insanity
i acquittal. A psychiatrist has no greater claim, nor do
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most want one, to state a person is sane or insane than
anyone else. In his daily work, he does not use the term
because it is of no use to him; the range from perfect
mental health (picture an Eastern mystic sitting, registering only delta waves for days on end) to complete
mental disintegration (watch Gong Show reruns) is a
continuum, marked by signposts, to be sure, but containing no bright lines. If you asked a psychiatrist
whether or not a particular subject was insane, he would
ask you first what you meant by the term and, second,
"for what purpose do you ask?" The law must strike a
proper balance between community morality (represented by the jury) and clinical data (delivered by expert witnesses). Currently, partly because of the uncertainties of the science of psychiatry and partly because of the law's inattention to the problem, the expert's
testimony often drifts away from purely clinical
material and begins to intrude on the moral question.
This situation came about only slowly. Until the 1950s,
the insanity instruction in most jurisdictions foreclosed
almost all useful clinical input. The chief problem was
that the "M'Naghten" instruction-which described
as insane only those who, because of mental disease or
defect, "could not tell right from wrong"- took account
only of cognitive impairment, and, even then, only
cognitive impairment of an excessive and unusual
kind. The defendant who knew he was acting wrongfully but could not, because of illness, control his actions
was convicted. The psychiatric community complained
that their testimony was foreclosed by a definition which
was foreign to their understanding of the problem.
Most defects, they said, were volitional defects. The law,
they said in effect, was asking the wrong question. The
reaction of individual psychiatrists differed. Some
refused to act as expert witnesses from a feeling that
they could not, and would not, shed light on the wrong
question. Others, surely with the aid of lawyers, began
to fudge their testimony. Once they were themselves
convinced that the defendant should not be held responsible, they began tailoring their testimony to the "rightwrong" test. If the law insisted on asking the "wrong"
question, the witness would answer the "right" question
to himself and then translate it into "wrong" language.
In this lay a terrible potential which soon came to
full flower. The "right" question - should the defendant
be held responsible?-is not a clinical question at all,
but a moral one. The precise question which the jury
was on hand for was being answered by someone else.
Under cover of clinical jargon, many psychiatrists
smuggled in their own moral outlook on responsibility.
And since the psychoanalytic image of man is relatively
a more deterministic one, the bias was toward acquittal.
The chief problem was that the testimony did not sound
like it evidenced a moral outlook; it sounded like eli-
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nical fact, it seemed like science. Nor was cross-examination much of a help in uncovering the soft parts. Crossexamining a psychiatrist is like arguing with Alice's
Humpty Dumpty-when he uses a word, it means
"whatever he wants it to mean, no more, no less." (You
will recognize that, coming from a lawyer, this is praise,
not condemnation.)
The only cure for psychiatric testimony is more psychiatric testimony. An attorney simply found a psychiatrist who resolved the "responsibility" question
differently and who would translate that into the framework of the "right-wrong" instruction. When accounting
for the wide disparity of psychiatric opinions, most
point to the facts that mental health and mental illness
are elusive concepts, that various· schools of thought
have arisen, that the mind of man is, after all, a complicated thing. After accounting for all this, there is still
more disagreement among psychiatrists inside the court
room than out. The reason is that outside they pursue
answers to clinical and therapeutic questions. Inside,
moral judgments are mixed in.

The Idea of ··substantial Capacity"
The call of the psychiatric community and others
for a more modern insanity instruction was finally answered in most jurisdictions by the adoption of the
"substantial capacity" test which both introduced volitional defect as the basis for insanity and removed the
absolutist language of the "right-wrong" test for cognitive defect. Psychiatrists are now free to give a greater
range of clinical evidence since evidence tending to
show volitional defect is no longer ruled inadmissable
as irrelevant. But, and this is an important but, the new
test for insanity, while it permits more clinical information, is not itself a clinical question. When one reads
it, the word "substantial" jumps off the page. That
word, at first blush a term of quantity or quality or both,
is ultimately a term of judgment. To illustrate, my five~
year-old son Karl, when he wants more milk than usual ,
asks for "too much milk." I keep trying to explain to
him the difference between a term of quantity-like
"eight ounces of milk" -and terms of judgment-like
"too much milk"- but he persists. (I think he understands it now but likes to hear the lecture.)
Precisely the same mistake is made when a psychiatrist is asked to render an opinion on whether or not a
given defendant had the "substantial" capacity to know
wrongfulness or to conform conduct. The word substantial only has meaning if there is an external referent. If I asked a psychiatrist whether X has the substantial mental stability to work in a nuclear plant, I would
not take "no" as inconsistent with his earlier opinion
that X had the substantial mental stability to drive a car.
The Cresset
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When we ask the "substantial-capacity" question m a
criminal trial , what is at bottom being asked is whether
the defendant's capacity was substantial enough to visit
on him the moral responsibility for his conduct. When
the psychiatrist is asked this question, he is being asked
to shift from giving clinical data to making a moral
judgment. The worst part of this is that the shift is not
noticed by the jury. He appears rather to be making a
scientific interpretation from facts. Of course it is absolutely necessary, if we are to understand him at all, for
a psychiatrist to make interpretive judgments about
the clinical data at hand. What must be kept clearly in
focus, however, is the distinction between interpretation wholly within the realm of expertise and the moral
judgment which is the peculiar province of the jury.
To clarify, consider an expert at accident reconstruction, with a physics background, being asked to estimate, from hard data found at the scene of an automobile
accident, the speeds at which the involved vehicles
were traveling when they collided. After testifying to
the length of skid marks, the type of road surface and
tires involved, after a dazzling exposition of the theory
of "conservation of momentum," and after some disclaimer based on uncontrollable variables, the expert
finally tells us that in his opinion vehicle A was traveling 30 miles an hour and vehicle B was traveling 20
miles per hour. I believe him so far, don't you? But now
he is asked if, in his opinion, vehicle A was traveling
"too fast." He wouldn't be allowed to testify, but even
if he were, why should we do more than feign polite
attention? "Too fast" is either a strictly legal question
which we can resolve by looking at the posted speed
limif, or a prudential (even slightly moral) question
about how to drive. The important thing to note is that
even if the expert testifies that 30 m.p.h. is or is not
"too fast," the jury is not misled into believing that
such is a scientific opinion. Rather the jury feels confident in overruling that interpretation if it disagrees
with it.
It might be argued that this analogy is unfair because
the science of psychiatry does not admit of such precise
quantitive or qualitative analysis, that much more depends on interpretation. This, however, suggests that
it is even more important in connection with psychiatry
to restrict the expert to his given field since there is
no quantity or quality within the jury's experience
against which to measure such interpretation. The jury
may believe our accident reconstructionist, but only
because it agrees with his interpretation. When the jury
agrees with the psychiatrist, it is sometimes because it
understood nothing at all of what he said. This is of
course compounded by the fact that with the psychiatrist
"facts" are often the product of interpretation and not
the basis for it.
September, 1982

A cardinal rule at common law stated that no witness,
expert or otherwise, could testify to an "ultimate issue
of fact." Th•_ls, while an eyewitness to a collision might
state that the driver "was traveling 80 miles per hou r,"
or "swerved across the center line," he could not testify
that the driver was "negligent" if such was an ultimate
i sue in the case. This rule has been largely discarded
and I only wish to say that my proposal bears no intention of reviving it. If the ultimate issue is a question of
physics, a physicist should be permitted to answer it
(though, as always, the jury may choose to answer it
differently). If it is a question of psychiatry, a psychiatrist should likewise be permitted to state his opinion.
My point is only that the ultimate issue of insanity is
a moral question and thus, referable solely to the ju ry.
Although there appears no ideal solution, I submit
that a scheme for managing the insanity defense
approaches the currently optimal solution when it
atisfies these criteria: 1) it permits the widest possible
range of expert psychiatric testimony on matters within
uch special expertise; 2) it forecloses psychiatric testimony on matters outside such expertise; 3) it assigns
the question of moral responsibility exclusively and unproblematically to the jury.

The ''Justly-Held-Responsible" Test
To this end, I suggest two changes. First, the judge
must not permit any interpretive judgments of an expert without a full prior exposition of the data on which
it is based; moreover, the expert may not give an opinion expressed in the language of the insanity definition.
econd, the instruction on insanity should read: "A
person is 'insane' if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he cannot be justly held responsible for his conduct."
The jurors are further instructed that the prosecution
must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt and that
they should consider all the testimony but not leave it
untested against their own common sense and life experience. This "justly-held-responsible" test is a centuryold idea which never went further than academia. (I
wouldn't bet the ranch on its going anywhere else now
either.) When put forth in the past, however, the supporting argument was that "insanity" as a clinical matter
was not yet well-enough understood to permit a better
definition. It was proposed in desperation. I support
it, instead, because it is not a good clinical definition,
because it subordinates all clinical interpretation to
moral judgment.
Testing "justly-held-responsible" against the abovestated criteria, such scheme offers great latitude to expert
testimony. Both cognitive and volitional defects are
relevant; the expert may, with proper foundation, give
opinions on the quantity or quality of defendant's capac11

ity in each regard. Not only may he testify fully to
these matters, but his testimony is not funneled into
jargon foreign or incoherent to him. He may testify
that the defendant "cannot tell right from wrong," or
that defendant "has substantial capacity," but he is not
forced to view the problem in those terms. The second
criterion is met because no expert is permitted to render
an opinion on whether the defendant may be "justly
held responsible" for his conduct. As to the third criterion, the moral question of responsibility is put
squarely to the jury.
One objection to such an open-ended instruction,
put forth by Abraham Goldstein of the Yale Law School
in his book The Insanity Defense, is that it gives the jury
no guidance, leaves it psychologically naked with no
impression that it follows, and thus can draw protection
from, a legal standard. The fact is that the "substantialcapacity" test really gives no guidance either, though it
may give the false impression of doing so. The effect
of that false impression may, in some cases, lead the jury
to abdicate its responsibility to expert witnesses or to
the meaningless words of a "test" for insanity. Although
we would ordinarily prefer a clearer standard to a vague
one, the issue is simply not amenable to more clarity
without the serious side effects noted earlier.
One other feature of the open-ended instruction is
important and sets it apart from all other suggested
modifications. Those who argue for new "tests," new
"verdicts," or new "burdens" begin with the premise,
sometimes expressed but often not, that the prevailing
rules generate either too many acquittals or too few.
The move from "right-wrong" to "substantial capacity"
was prompted by a belief that the former, because it
excluded the volitionally-incapable, convicted people
it should not. The GBMI verdict was clearly a reaction
to acquittals of notorious defendants. I do not know
whether the "justly-held-responsible" instruction will
produce more acquittals than any other scheme or less,
and it is not the intention of the proposal to do either.
The number of acquittals depends on the community's
sense of morality as expressed through its representative, the jury. The acquittal rate may fluctuate with
new insights from psychiatry and as public opinion on
the issue ebbs and flows. Such fluctuation is not pathological-it shows that the moral dialogue continues
unaffected by artificial determinants.
One cannot even tell whether or not the "justly-heldresponsible" test would have changed the Hinckley
outcome. Juror Copelin could not so easily claim that
the jury was "locked in by the law." My own guess is
that the result would not have been different. I don't
think the jury was "locked in" by the law; prosecution
expert witnesses had testified that Hinckley did have
substantial capacity. Perhaps they were locked in by a
belief that conviction in such a case was not morally
defensible. Under the open-ended "justly-held-responsible" test, such belief is all that can, or should, ever
lock a jury in.

Ground Zero
We are on harbor-watch.
Our anchor is ephemeral.
Bones surrender,
and the sun's radiance
bursts through our dust.
Words hang to the wind
like a torn flag,
and the last light of one
of many afternoons
slides
along ordinary walls.
This is the final emblem.
We are on harbor-watch
under a sorrow
of metaphors.

Nun's Secret
She offered her Savior
the laminated circles
of her winterbreath.
She offered him
this counterpoint
to her darkened spirit.
Her prayer, enigmatic,
was hidden like an undergrowth
of bark. She prayed:
Let me walk with Your shadow.
Let me know.
And now, late at night,
her hands dare enfold
in the presence of the unseen.
These hands
that touch the untouched,
are the essence of her prayer.

Rudolf Wittenberg
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